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I. INTRODUCTION
In connection with the January 2011 Annual Meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools (AALS) held in San
Francisco, California, the AALS Section on Litigation (Litigation
Section) sponsored a panel discussion on "Current Issues in Judicial
Disqualification" (the Program). The AALS Sections on
Professional Responsibility and Civil Procedure co-sponsored the
Program, which featured a call for papers-the winners of which
follow here.
Our judicial branch of government is critical to the nation's
stability, and its legitimacy has allowed it to weigh in on many of
this country's most divisive issues, not the least of which being Bush
v. Gore,I the United States Supreme Court decision that effectively
decided the 2000 presidential election. However, the legitimacy of
our judicial branch depends on the impartiality of our judges.
Ten years ago, the Litigation Section spotlighted judicial bias
in its 2001 annual program when it questioned the impartiality of the
Louisiana Supreme Court. The court limited Louisiana's law student
practice rule, effectively barring the Tulane University Law School's
Environmental Clinic (Tulane Clinic) from representing community
groups that had successfully blocked construction of chemical plants
* Clinical Associate Professor of Law at Fordham University School of
Law and the 2010 Chair of the American Association of Law Schools' Section on
Litigation.
1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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in low-income, largely African-American communities
overburdened with environmentally hazardous businesses.2 The
Tulane Clinic's success in a string of such representations mobilized
the business community, which heavily contributed to the electoral
campaigns of the popularly elected Louisiana Supreme Court
justices. The business community lobbied heavily for a change to
the student practice rule.3 A classic follow-the-money chart could
then be drawn from the business lobbyists to the chambers of the
chief justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court, who then changed the
student practice rule in Louisiana to effectively bar the Tulane Clinic
from representing these types of communities. 4 The Tulane Clinic
case spotlighted how campaign contributions could create an
appearance of bias in a judiciary reliant on such funds for re-election.
More generally, it cast doubt on judges' impartiality and whether
judges can be trusted to step aside if their impartiality could
reasonably be called into question.
The media attention on thiss and other examples of judges
acting with apparent questionable impartiality 6 has helped fuel a
potential crisis in the public's confidence in our judiciary,
particularly over the question of whether our judiciary is truly
impartial. This concern has spurred interesting shifts in the judicial
recusal landscape in the decade that has followed the Litigation
Section's 2001 Tulane Clinic-inspired program.
2. Adam Glaser, The Implications of Changes to Louisiana's Law Clinic
Student Practice Rule, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 751, 751-52 (1999); Sam A.
LeBlanc III, Debate over the Law Clinic Practice Rule: Redux, 74 TUL. L. REv.
219, 225 (1999).
3. LeBlanc, supra note 2, at 223.
4. Glaser, supra note 2, at 751. The changes to the amended Rule XX were
almost identical to those proposed by the business groups. Id. at 760.
5. E.g., Frontline, Justice for Sale (PBS television broadcast Nov. 23, 1999);
60 Minutes II, Justice for Sale? (CBS television broadcast Mar. 24, 2000); Ralph
Blumenthal, DeLay Case Turns Spotlight on Texas Judicial System, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 2005, at Al; Cary Goldberg, Judge's Speech at Abortion Rally Sets Off
Dispute on Free Speech and Impartiality, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1997, § 1, at 18.
6. Other high profile examples include the following: Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009); Dan Collins, Scalia-Cheney Trip Raises




II. SHIFTS IN THE JUDICIAL RECUSAL LANDSCAPE SINCE 2001
Seismic shifts in the judicial recusal landscape since 2001-
an area known for its glacial pace of change-led the Litigation
Section to return to the topic of judicial bias this year. Three U.S.
Supreme Court cases have provided much of the momentum. First,
in June 2002, the Court invalidated many restrictions on judicial
campaign speech in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.' In
White, the Court held that judicial candidates have a First
Amendment right to announce their views on issues that they may
decide as judges8 and, in doing so, opened up a debate as to whether
such pronouncements threaten to undermine public confidence in
judicial impartiality.
Next, in 2009, the Court ruled in Caperton v. A. T. Massey
Coal Co.9 that due process required disqualification of a West
Virginia Supreme Court justice whose campaign received $3 million
in campaign support from A.T. Massey Coal Company's CEO.10
The CEO contributed via independent expenditures, rather than
direct campaign contributions, which were limited to $1,000 under
state law." With Justice Kennedy writing for a 5-4 majority, the
Court decided that due process required state judges to recuse
themselves from cases in which a financial donor, who has played a
significant monetary role in the judge's successful electoral bid to
serve on the very bench before which the donor's case is pending, is
a party before the court.12 Justice Kennedy wrote that without an
objective rule that requires a "realistic appraisal of psychological
tendencies and human weaknesses"13 of the judicial mind, "there
may be no adequate protection against a judge who simply misreads
or misapprehends the real motives at work in deciding the case."1 4
Justice Kennedy's calling for an objective rule prevailed over the
Justice Roberts-led dissent, which pointedly argued, "[t]here is a
'presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as
adjudicators.' All judges take an oath to uphold the Constitution and
7. 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
8. Id. at 781-82.
9. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
10. Id. at 2263-64.
11. Id. at 2257.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2255 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
14. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263.
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apply the law impartially, and we trust that they will live up to this
promise."
Last , in 2010, Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission 6 invalidated restrictions on direct corporate
expenditures concerning political issues.' 7  Though not dealing
directly with judicial recusal, Citizens United struck down a carefully
crafted congressional statute meant to limit direct corporate
electioneering and sent a message that campaign finance laws cannot
hope to limit such electioneering. In doing so, it raised the stakes
with regard to potential appearances of partiality resulting from
judicial electoral processes. The scope of Citizens United remains a
matter of debate, as reflected in the famous dustup between President
Obama and Justice Alito during the 2010 State of the Union
address.' 8  Nonetheless, as Justice Stevens suggests in his ninety-
page Citizens United dissent,19 the floodgates have opened for
shareholder and union money to pour into judicial elections, with
only Caperton's narrow limits stemming the flow. 20
The Supreme Court's decisions in White and Citizens United
exacerbated the potential for crisis in the public's confidence in the
15. Id. at 2267 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
16. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
17. Id. at 896-98.
18. See Emily Bazelon, Mysterious Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2011, at
MM13 (reporting the instance in which Justice Alito mouthed "not true" when
President Obama referred to the Citizens United ruling as reversing long-standing
precedent to benefit corporate interests).
19. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 968 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("The majority of the States select their judges through popular
elections. At a time when concerns about the conduct of judicial elections have
reached a fever pitch, the Court today unleashes the floodgates of corporate and
union general treasury spending in these races." (citation omitted)). Justice
Stevens also noted that, after Citizens United, states "may no longer have the
ability to place modest limits on corporate electioneering even if they believe such
limits to be critical to maintaining the integrity of their judicial systems." Id.
20. Indeed, this term, in Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC
v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 64 (U.S. Nov.
29, 2010) (No. 10-238), and McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2010),
cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 644 (U.S. Nov. 29, 2010) (No. 10-239), the Supreme
Court is expected to strike down, on First Amendment grounds, a provision in
Arizona's campaign finance law that would allow a publicly-financed candidate to
receive public funds that would match the sum of a privately-financed opponent's
contributions and the value of independent expenditures on behalf of the opponent.




judiciary by invalidating laws that protected the perceived
impartiality of elected state judges. In recent years, the American
Bar Association has attempted to address this crisis by amending its
Model Code of Judicial Conduct (the Code), which since 1924 has
been the model on which states base their codes of judicial ethics.21
Since 1999, the ABA has added two enumerated presumptive
categories of disqualification to the section of the Code addressing
judicial disqualification, 22 including the disqualification of judges
from (1) hearing cases involving significant campaign contributors23
21. The history of the ABA's involvement with a code of ethics for judges
extends back to 1924, when an ABA Committee chaired by then Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court William Taft produced the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which the
ABA House of Delegates adopted in 1924. See Preface, MODEL CODE OF JUD.
CONDUCT (2004), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professionalresponsibility/publications/mode
Icode ofjudicial_conduct/model code of judicial conduct~preface.html
(noting that the Code replaced the Canons of Judicial Ethics). Though the Canons
represented the first cohesive framework to inform judges of their ethical
obligations, their language was aspirational and not mandatory. In 1972, the ABA
House of Delegates replaced the Canons with the Code of Judicial Conduct, which
contained "mandatory standards." CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Preamble (1972). In
1990, the House of Delegates adopted an amended Code of Judicial Ethics (see
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Preface (2004) (discussing publication of the
Code)), and did so again in 2007. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Preface
(2007) (incorporating the "housekeeping" revisions approved by the ABA
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility).
22. Rule 2.11 of the 2007 ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, entitled
"Disqualification," captures a total of six presumptive categories of
disqualification and includes a residuary clause addressing when the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless as to whether it is covered
in the six presumptive categories. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)
(2007). The six presumptive categories are: (1) personal bias in favor of or
against a party or lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts relevant to the
controversy; (2) the judge (or a close relation) is counsel, a party, a person with a
more than de minimis interest, or a material witness in the case; (3) the judge (or a
close relation) has an economic interest in the outcome of the case; (4) the judge
has received political contributions from a lawyer or party in a case; (5) the judge
has made a public statement, other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or
opinion, that commits or appears to commit the judge to reach a particular result in
a case; and (6) the judge participated as a lawyer, party, or material witness in the
case prior to joining the bench. Id. at R. 2.11(A)(l)-(6).
23. Id at R. 2.11 (A)(4). The Canon left to states how many previous years
contribution were made and the threshold amounts of the contributions. Id. Even
if the amount of the donation was under the proscribed amount or the donation
occurred outside of the proscribed period, a motion for recusal could still be made
under Rule 2.1 1(A)'s residuary clause.
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and (2) issues on which they had made prior public statements that
24
would appear to commit them to the issues' resolutions. In
addition, in 2007, the ABA's Standing Committee on Judicial
Independence launched the Judicial Disqualification Project to
evaluate state judicial disqualification around the country and
recommend reforms.25
However, also in 2007, the ABA almost downgraded the
avoiding-the-appearance-of-impropriety standard from an
enforceable standard to an aspirational goal, given the vagueness of
the standard. Ultimately, at the urging of the Conference of Chief
Justices and a number of legal organizations, the ABA retained the
"appearance of impropriety" as an enforceable rule.26
Following the ABA's lead, states have responded to these
shifts in the judicial recusal landscape. Some have revised rules to
bar elected judges from hearing cases involving lawyers and others
who make significant contributions to their campaigns.27 Yet, of the
twenty-nine states that have adopted the revised 2007 ABA Code of
Judicial Conduct, only ten have included the provision on campaign
contribution limits. 28 Although some states may have omitted the
campaign contribution limit provision for purely practical reasons,
such as their judges not being popularly elected, most of the states
omitted the provision to avoid either the contribution limit itself or
the political fight over the contribution limit.29
24. Id. at R. 2.11(A)(5).
25. ABA Judicial Disqualification Project, Taking Disqualification Seriously,
92 JUDICATURE 12, 12 (2008).
26. See generally Charles Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters.
Again., 30 REV. LITIG. 671, 695 (2011); CHARLES E. [sIc] GEYH & W. WILLIAM
HODES, REPORTERS' NOTES TO THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 17-18
(2007) (noting the inclusion of the "appearance of impropriety" language). See
also Editorial, The A.B.A. 's Judicial Ethics Mess, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2007, at
A 18 (describing reinstatement of the "appearance of impropriety" standards).
27. William Glaberson, State is Cutting Judges' Ties to Lawyers Who Are
Donors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2011, at Al.
28. CTR. FOR JUDICIAL ETHICS, AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y, JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFICATIONS BASED ON COMMITMENTS AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 1-
2 (2011), available at http://www.ajs.org/ethics/pdfs/Disqualificationcommitments
contributions.pdf; Joel Stashenko, State Bar Adopts Updated Judicial Conduct
Code, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 6, 2011, at 1.
29. The New York State Bar Association (NYSBA) adopted amendments to
its Judicial Code of Conduct that brought it into conformity with the 2007 ABA
Code of Judicial Conduct, but it did not include the contribution limit provision.
Stashenko, supra note 28, at 1. Instead, the NYSBA chose to debate a
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These developments, along with the zealous assertions of
interest groups into judicial elections 30 and emerging research on the
risk of judges' unconscious biases,31 reveal that issues of judicial
disqualification are more prominent than ever in litigation. The
Litigation Section's 2011 Program spotlighted this shift in
momentum on judicial recusal. The Program (1) explored the
current landscape of the recusal rules in state and federal court; (2)
reviewed the path that future revisions to the judicial recusal rules
would likely take; and (3) ended with a focus on the practical effects
that judicial recusal motions raise for the litigators who must make
these motions. The papers that follow here are the fruits of that
discussion.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE PAPERS
Four papers follow herein and focus on (1) the current state
of the recusal rules and law in the federal courts; (2) a vision of the
recusal rules moving towards a more procedural-based regime,
where discretion is lessened and the goal of the appearance of
impartiality trumps the aim for judicial efficiency; (3) a more
tempered view of change with procedural-based reform, but
otherwise maintaining the current appearances-based model that
allows for greater discretion and judicial efficiency; and (4) a call for
First Amendment protection for lawyers making colorable recusal
contribution limit separately, as it is now entertaining a rule proposed by the chief
judge of the state's highest court to require recusal of judges in cases involving
parties or lawyers who have contributed $2500, or law firms that have contributed
$3500, to the judge's campaign. Id.
30. See Press Release, Brennan Ctr. for Justice at New York University
School of Law, TV Ad Spending By Special Interest Groups Tops $1 Million in
Wisconsin Judicial Election (Mar. 3, 2011), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/tvad spending by specialintere
stgroupstops 1_millionin wisconsin judic/ (identifying three interest groups
which spent more that $1.14 million on TV ads during the last Wisconsin Supreme
Court election).
31. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias
Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1195 (2009) (concluding that
judges are not immune from implicit biases); Michael H. LeRoy, Do Partisan
Elections of Judges Produce Unequal Justice When Courts Review Employment
Arbitrations?, 95 IowA L. REv. 1569, 1592-95 (2010) (discussing how partisan
elections may cause judges to distribute justice based on political contributions).
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motions to preserve their clients' rights to an impartial judge.
A. Honorable M Margaret McKeown's Overview of the
Federal Recusal Scheme
The Honorable M. Margaret McKeown, a distinguished
federal appeals judge on the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
and the Chair of the Committee on Codes of Conduct of the Judicial
Conference of the United States (Judicial Conference Committee on
Codes of Conduct), provides an overview of the recusal rules in the
federal courts, while also cautioning against overreaction to episodic
publicity that obscures the effectiveness of the current recusal
regime. Judge McKeown, who has testified before Congress on
judicial disqualification issues, summarizes 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and
455(a), which formally govern judicial recusal for federal judges.3 2
Judge McKeown then shows how the recusal statutes dovetail with
the Codes of Conduct for United States Judges, which apply to all
federal judges, except for the Justices of the United States Supreme
Court. She also reviews the functioning of the Judicial Conference
Committee on Codes of Conduct, which annually issues
approximately 100 advisory opinions and 1,000 responses to
informal requests, giving fascinating insight into how the committee
assists judges around the country with ethical quandaries, often
within days. Practically speaking, the issue of recusal in the federal
judiciary is far less controversial than in the state system because of
the lack of publicly elected judges. Nonetheless, as Judge McKeown
notes, the substantial procedural requirements in the federal system,
coupled with the high degree of professionalism among the federal
judiciary, minimizes the potential for judicial recusal controversy in
the federal system. Indeed, even where a recusal issue may be less
clear, Judge McKeown's Committee assists in ensuring that the
judges get it right. Judge McKeown's analysis suggests that further
procedural reform at the federal level is unnecessary and may come
at the cost of inefficiencies of frivolous motions, if not outright judge
shopping.
32. 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 & 455(a) (2006).
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B. Professors Charles Geyh and Jeffrey Stempel Debate
Future Approaches to the Recusal Rules
Professors Charles Geyh33 and Jeffrey Stempel34 offer
competing views on the future of judicial recusal rules. Both see
error in the commonly held view that disqualification motions and
attorney allegations of partiality or bias are an affront to the
individual judge's personal judicial integrity and find this dynamic to
be at the core of the problem. They differ in that Professor Geyh
seeks procedural reform to rein in a judiciary unable to believe that
reasonable jurors might question its impartiality, while Professor
Stempel, perhaps quixotically, holds out hope that judges can move
away from viewing recusal motions as personal attacks.
Professor Geyh first reviews the history of judicial
disqualification to highlight four distinct regimes: (1) an almost
iron-clad common-law presumption of impartiality, in which courts
refused to entertain even the possibility of judicial bias; (2) a
statutory approach based on conflict of interest, in which judges
were required to disqualify themselves when confronted with
specifically enumerated conflicts of interest in a statute; (3) a
disqualification procedure that required judges to recuse themselves
automatically if aggrieved parties made specified allegations
pursuant to specified procedures; and (4) an appearances-based
regime that organizes disqualification standards around the principle
that a judge should step aside when her impartiality "might
reasonably be questioned." 3 5  Professor Geyh notes how vestiges
from each regime remain, "coexisting peacefully at some times and
uneasily at others." 36
Professor Geyh then spotlights the "disqualification paradox"
for judges: in taking their judicial oath of office, judges commit
themselves to being and appearing to be impartial, and yet, the
disqualification rules require judges to find themselves not to be, or
33. Professor Geyh is the Associate Dean for Research and John F. Kimberly
Professor of Law at Indiana Bloomington School of Law, the Director of the ABA
Judicial Disqualification Project, and the Reporter to four ABA Commissions
relevant to judicial recusal, including the Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct.
34. Professor Stempel is the Doris S. and Theodore B. Lee Professor of Law
at the University of Nevada at Las Vegas.
35. Geyh, supra note 26, at 675.
36. Id.
Symposium 2011 ] 647
THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION
not to appear, impartial. This inherent tension suggests that most
judges would find themselves to be impartial despite facts that might
cause parties to reasonably question the judges' impartiality. As
such, the paradox favors procedural-based reform that creates greater
distance between the judge and the decision to recuse, through such
procedures as assigning disqualification petitions to a different
judge; subjecting disqualification to the adversarial process;
requiring reasoned explanations for disqualification rulings; adopting
substitution procedures for trial judges; subjecting non-
disqualification decisions to de novo review; establishing a process
for review of non-disqualification by appellate judges; and devising
procedures to replace disqualified appellate judges. In suggesting
these procedures, Professor Geyh attempts to manage the judiciary's
chronic ambivalence to disqualification by encouraging judges to
appreciate the dual psychological impediments to judicial self-
evaluation: a lack of recognition of their own biases and an inability
to see themselves and their actions as the public might reasonably
perceive them. Thus, the innocuous behavior that gives rise to an
appearance of partiality should not result in an inference of
impropriety. Professor Geyh also makes a persuasive case for
procedural reform by suggesting that ensuring judicial impartiality
and the public's confidence in the judiciary is worth the
inefficiencies procedural reforms will likely engender.
Professor Stempel would not abandon an appearance-based
review in favor of Professor Geyh's call for a procedural-based
regime. He accepts Professor Geyh's call for procedural reform but
only as a buttress to an appearance-based model. The appearance-
based regime focuses on what reasonably objective people might feel
about a judge's impartiality in a given situation, and, according to
Professor Stempel, this construct appropriately underlies the recusal
analysis. Both Professors Geyh and Stempel agree that
"traditionalist judges"-those less likely to recuse themselves and a
substantial majority of judges overall-hold a strong presumption of
judicial impartiality and look for overwhelming evidence that their
impartiality can reasonably be called into question. These judges
either dismiss or are otherwise unaware of cognitive biases that cast
doubt on this traditionalist notion of presumed impartiality. Both
professors also believe only that a modest presumption of judicial
impartiality should reign. Professor Stempel breaks with Professor
Geyh by insisting that judges can and should change their views as to
this presumption of impartiality and, consequently, should recuse
648 [Vol. 30:4
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when an appearance-based review requires them to step away.
Professor Stempel argues that judges must accept an
enhanced conception of a "reasonable question" as to impartiality
and that "consensus-or even a clear majority view"-is
unnecessary to justify recusal.3 Professor Stempel believes judges
must be significantly more aware of their biases. With this
awareness, judges will be far less inclined to adopt such a strong
presumption of their impartiality. Thus, both a stronger definitional
sense of the appearance of fairness and some substantial judicial
consciousness-raising are necessary. In addition, Professor Stempel
would use the procedural reforms identified by Professor Geyh to
improve upon the dominant appearance-based review currently in
use. Professor Stempel acknowledges that a strengthened procedural
approach to judicial disqualification is critical to enhancing judicial
impartiality and public confidence in the courts, even at the cost of
some attendant logistical burdens. However, he insists that there
must also be a broadened definition of the existence of a "reasonable
question" as to impartiality and greater sensitivity on the part of the
bench, the bar, and the public.
While Professor Geyh might agree with Professor Stempel
that judges should change their enhanced presumption of their own
impartiality, he is less optimistic that judges will in fact do so.
Therefore, Professor Geyh relies on procedural reforms to overcome
this bias in favor of finding impartiality. Professor Stempel
concedes that his vision for improving the recusal regime may not be
attainable in the current climate: "Jurists-particularly at the
Supreme Court level-have occasionally shown a disturbing
defensiveness, insensitivity, and even some seeming ignorance
regarding the area . . .. Until the judiciary accepts this notion,
litigants are inadequately protected from potential judicial bias and
public confidence is inadequately nurtured." 38
37. Jeffrey W. Stempel, In Praise of Procedurally Centered Judicial
Disqualification-and a Stronger Conception of the Appearance Standard: Better
Acknowledging and Adjusting to Cognitive Bias, Spoliation, and Perceptual
Realities, 30 REv. LITIG. 733, 739 (2011).
38. Id. at 740.
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C. Professor Margaret Tarkington's Callfor First
Amendment Protection for Lawyers Who Impugn
Judicial Integrity in the Context ofRecusal Motions
Akin to Alice's needing to be able to tell the Queen of Hearts
that her croquet game is fundamentally flawed without fearing the
Queen's wrath ("Off with her head!"), 39 Professor Margaret
Tarkington40 argues that lawyers should have a free speech right to
make colorable arguments in court proceedings and to preserve the
constitutional rights of clients. Recusal motions are ripe for this
protection. The Court in Caperton found that an individual's due
process rights could be violated if a judge declined to recuse
herself.41 A lawyer's duty to protect her client includes making
motions that would ensure the due process rights of her client. As
Professor Tarkington notes, judges tend to react sharply to having
their impartiality questioned, and, in a number of instances, judges
have punished attorneys for speech questioning judicial impartiality,
even when done as part of a motion to disqualify a judge. Professor
Tarkington also shows that the Caperton majority rightfully viewed
disqualification as being disassociated with reputational harm to the
judiciary and, as such, not warranting punishment.
The inherent risks associated with the recusal motion further
suggest that punishment for such motions is unnecessary. Any
litigator knows that to question a judge's impartiality is to take an
enormous strategic risk in the litigation, given there is no guarantee
that the motion will be granted. This is a powerful deterrent to
unwarranted recusal motions. But even if that were not enough,
attorneys also face the strictures of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11 and Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1, which require a
reasonable basis in fact for such motions. Thus, as Professor
Tarkington persuasively argues, Free Speech Clause rights in the
39. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND 121-25 (The MacMillan Co.
1897).
40. Professor Tarkington is an Associate Professor of Law at Brigham Young
University School of Law. Her scholarship has examined the punishment of
attorney speech, which in the context of good faith representation of clients, is
critical of the judiciary. See Margaret Tarkington, A Free Speech Right to Impugn
Judicial Integrity in Court Proceedings, 51 B.C. L. REv. 363, 363 (2010)
(discussing why a free speech right to impugn judicial integrity must be recognized
for attorneys when acting as officers of the court and making statements in court
proceedings).
41. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259 (2009).
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context of recusal motions would only eliminate the lawyer's
personal risk that such motions might fall within the bounds of Rule
11 and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct-i.e., motions
made with a good faith basis.
IV. CONCLUSION
Public confidence in the judiciary's integrity is critical, and
public trust that judges will remain impartial is crucial to that
integrity. All of the authors in this symposium recognize the need to
ensure that judges, attorneys, litigants, and the public cease equating
disqualification with reputational harm and thus with potential
discipline for impugning judicial integrity. This may be the lynchpin
in ensuring that judicial impartiality-in fact and appearance-
remains a hallmark of our judicial branch. Until that re-education is
accomplished, it may be time to pass procedural reforms that seek to
limit the discretion of judges less inclined to find that a reasonable
observer might find a lack of impartiality in recusal motions.
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